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ABSTRACT 
 
The National Fuel subsidy system planning in Malaysia 
should it persist would have elevated the Multi-purpose 
of MyKad.  Malaysian government is planning for a new 
MyID system that can retrieve governmental related 
documents when dealing with 760 governments and 
agencies nationwide (The Star, 2010). This move will 
leverage the existing infrastructure of MyKad. The wider 
usage of MyKad may raise public concern regarding its 
security.  Thus, there is a need for assessing the security 
of MyKad by an independent third party. This paper will 
first discuss vulnerability of smartcard by using the 
attack potential model (CCDB, 2008), and then the 
appropriateness of the current methods and tools to test 
the security of smartcard will be investigated. The study 
concludes that there is no yet a standard of security 
testing tool imposed on smartcard in Malaysia. The 
study promotes the developing of security testing tool for 
MyKad.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are endless opportunities created by information 
technology (IT) including embracing a knowledge-based 
economy. Government multi-purpose card (GMPC) also 
known as MyKad, is one of the Malaysian government’s 
efforts towards accepting e-government.  The main 
objectives of which are: to support the payment and 
future government applications on a single MPC 
platform; to enhance customer service; and to strengthen 
security on the existing and new applications delivered 
on the MPC platform.  This may spur knowledge sharing 
between the service providers and the citizens that use 
the technology.  However, the area of preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
information embedded in MyKad should also be 
considered.  Since MyKad is a multi-purpose smartcard, 
it is subjected to many different types of attacks aiming 
at tampering the chip or parts of it, in order to retrieve 
secret information. (Anderson, 2001) 
 
 
 
1.1 Smartcard 
The main feature of smartcard is it’s resistant to attack 
and tamper resistant computer microprocessor chips. 
They have the ability to run applications to make 
computations on data and programs stored in memory. 
Multi-applications operating system smartcard also need 
the ability to load card applications side by side and 
provide the card with a variety of separate functions such 
as digital identity such as biometric verification, 
electronic cash, medical records and other applications. 
The smartcard security should be independent of the 
applications that are loaded to the card. The internal 
structure of multi-application operating system smartcard 
is made up of functionalities as follows: 
• operating system which allowing access in a secured 
and controlled manner to the raw processing power of 
the chip as well as useful libraries for functionality 
such as cryptography; 
• a virtual machine that allows loaded applications to be 
interpreted and executed which is conformed to the 
virtual machine API and are compiled from common 
high-level language such as C, Java, small language, 
virtual basic etc; and 
• a card manager for controlling the security, including 
such functions that support loading and deleting of 
card application.  
 
It is noted that the study by Elliott (2001) has been 
addressing on the comparison between Java card, 
Multos, MfSC and open platform but not the comparison 
between MCOS and any other multi-application 
smartcard. The brief comparison between the two multi-
application operating system of smartcard which is 
MCOS and Java card is given in the following tables 1-3.  
 
Table 1: Basic Information 
 
 MCOS Java card 
Developer IRIS Corporation, 
Malaysia. 
Sun Microsystems and 
Java card forum 
Design 
objective 
e-passport and ID 
application 
IT-  based platform- 
independent 
implementations and 
telecommunication 
application 
Application MCS Sun Microsystems 
Conformance 
/ Compliance 
to 
International 
standards for 
smartcard  
ISO 7816 
ISO 1443 
 
ISO 7816 
ISO 1443 
Global Platform  
EMV 
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Table 2: Security comparison 
 
 MCOS Java card 
Cryptographic 
support 
RSA, DES, ECC, 
AES and SHA1 
(Device dependent) 
RSA, DES, ECC, 
AES and SHA1 
(Device dependent) 
RSA and ECC 
(Asymmetric) 
Device dependent 
2.048- bit RSA, 256-
bit ECC 
Device dependent 
2.048- bit RSA, 
256-bit ECC 
 
DES/DES3 & 
AEC 
(Symmetric) 
Device dépendent, 
64-bit DES, DES3 
Device dependent, 
64-bit DES, DES3 
Application 
segregation on 
card 
Strict segregation Strict based on 
application 
packages with some 
level of code 
sharing 
Certification In the process of 
certification of 
Common Criteria, 
EAL4+ 
Some versions have 
been certified for  
Common Criteria, 
EAL4+ 
Secure 
Application 
Load and delete 
Supported by 
asymmetric and 
symmetric 
cryptography 
 
Available with 
global platform card 
manager only 
Cryptographic 
support 
RSA, DES, ECC, 
AES and SHA1 
(Device dependent) 
RSA, DES, ECC, 
AES and SHA1 
(Device dependent) 
 
Table 3: General comparison 
 
 MCOS Java card 
Multi-
Application 
support 
Available Available 
Global Platform 
Standard 
Architecture 
designed for 
National multi-
application and line 
with standard 
 
Java card 
specifications 
evolved to support 
multi-application 
through dramatic 
change 
Silicon/Chip 
support 
Atmel, My-MS, 
Renassas, ST 
Atmel, Infineon, 
NXP, Renassas, 
Samsung, ST 
 
Multi-
Application 
support 
Available Available 
 
1.1 MyKad Overview 
MCOS (Figure 1) was first introduced in 1996 for e-
passport project. It’s was introduced for its smartcard on 
5th September 2001, which is called MyKad. It was 
developed by IRIS Corporation for ID application. It is 
based on 32 Kbytes or 64 Kbytes EEPROM contact 
smartcards chip from ATMEL and ST Microelectronic 
respectively and embedded together into the hybrid card 
is 1 Kbyte MIFARE Classic contact less chip from NXP 
(Phillip). Each of the three chips is having its own 
separate operating system and there is no sharing of data 
(Meor, 2002). MCOS is a smartcard operating system 
purpose-designed for national ID applications. MyKad 
incorporates nine applications i.e. national identity card, 
driving license, passport information, transit card (which 
is called Touch ‘n Go), automated teller machine (ATM) 
card, e-cash card (which is called MEPS Cash), 
electronic health information, public key infrastructure 
(PKI), and frequent traveler card (FTC) (RFID News, 
2005). An important feature of MyKad is the usage of 
biometrics verification, chip technology such as the 
digital photo and basic data in chip, encryption and 
decryption and mutual authentication (challenge and 
response). A multi-application operating system, MCOS 
simultaneously supports multiple custom applets with 
custom instruction sets and data structures from several 
agencies on a single smartcard, limited only by the IC 
specifications. The internal structure of MyKad is made 
up of operating system (OS), native code, small machine 
language, API and the applet. In term of the standard, it 
is conform to the ISO 7816 and ISO 1443. 
 
The basic structure of MCOS is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Basic structure of MCOS 
 
1.2 Java Card Overview 
Java card (Figure 2) was launched in 1995-1996. Java 
smartcard is a CPU card based on the Java language. It’s 
a subset of a standard Java language, like a small 
computer which is fully operational and its hardware that 
ensure the need of run time environment of Java card. 
The internal structure of Java card is made up of 
operating system (OS), Java virtual machine language, 
API and the applets. The Java card forum 
(www.javacardforum.org) develop and recommended the 
specification to Sun Micro system and have had their 
most success in mobile telecommunication sectors. In 
term of the standard, it is also conform to the ISO 7816, 
ISO 1443 and global platform. 
 
The basic structure of Java card is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Specific Card Applications including third-
party applets – ID, Passport, Health, Driver 
License, Java, EMV, CEPS, Visa Cash, Proton 
Operating System with PKI layer
Small 
machine 
code 
with PKI 
layer  MCOS 
Cryptographic and I/O FunctionsNative 
Code 
Hardware IC 
Applet AppletApplet 
Java Card Industry Specific 
APIs
Installer
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Figure 2: Basic structure of Java card 
 
2.0 VULNERABILITY OF SMARTCARD  
 
The implementation of secure applications on smartcard 
is different to the development on other platforms. 
Smartcard have limited computing power, small amounts 
of memory and are reliant on a smartcard reader to 
provide power and a clock. There are security 
considerations that are specific to smartcard that need to 
be taken into account when developing a secure 
smartcard based application. 
 
2.1 The Taxonomy of Attackers 
The adoption of the taxonomy of attackers is proposed 
by IBM that characterizes some extent of tamper 
resistant (Mead, 2006). The taxonomy of attacker is as 
shown in table 4 below: 
 
Table 4: Taxonomy of attacker and their goal 
 
Attackers  
Class 1:  
Clever outsiders 
They are often very intelligent but 
may have insufficient knowledge of 
the system. They may have access to 
only moderately sophisticated 
equipment. They often try to take 
advantage of an existing weakness in 
the system, rather than try to create 
one.  
 
Class II:  
Knowledgeable 
Insiders 
They have substantial specialized 
technical education and experience. 
They have varying degrees of 
understanding of parts of the system 
but potential access to most of it. 
They often have highly sophisticated 
tools and instruments for analysis 
Class III:  
Funded 
Organization 
They are able to assemble teams of 
specialists with related and 
complementary skills backed by great 
funding resources. They are capable 
of in-depth analysis of the system, 
designing sophisticated attacks, and 
using the most advanced analysis 
tools. They may use Class II 
adversaries as part of the attack team. 
 Attacker goals 
i) To get the crypto keys in RAM 
or ROM 
ii) To learn the secret crypto 
algorithm used 
iii) To obtain other information 
stored into the chip (PINs) 
iv) To modify information on the 
card(calling card balance) 
 
Attackers are assumed to have a various level of 
expertise, resources and motivation. Motivation of the 
attacker can also include economic rewards or the 
satisfaction and notoriety of defeating expert security. 
Relevant expertise may be in semiconductor technology, 
software engineering, hacking technique, or in the 
specific smartcard applications. 
 
2.2 Methods of Attacks on Smartcard 
According to Adam (2006), there are four methods of 
attacks on smartcard which are physical, environmental, 
side channel and software. Besides Adam (2006), studies 
have been carried out by Aderson and Kuhn (1996), 
Kommerling and Kuhn (1999) on physical attacks. In 
addition, Gamdolfi, Mourtel and Oliver (2001), 
Quisquater and Samyde(2001), Skorobogatov and 
Anderson(2002), Skorobogatov(2005) and Bar-E, 
Choukri, Naccache, Turtall and Whelan(2006) have 
named environmental attacks as one of the attacks on 
smartcard.  Meanwhile, Aderson and Kuhn (1996), 
Kocher, Jaffe and Jun (1999), Skorobogatov(2005) and 
Mangard,Oswald and Popp(2007) confirmed that side 
channel attacks is one of the smartcard attacks. Leroy 
(2003) stressed that smartcard can also be attack through 
software attacks. The methods of attacks that are specific 
to smartcard are as shown in table 5 below: 
 
Table 5: The four methods of attacks 
 
Type 
 of Attacks 
Methods 
Physical  
 
 
Rewiring circuit on the chip (adding tracks to 
the chip in order to restore circuitry during 
the production process to test the chip before 
it has been finalized). 
Cutting the track on the chip in order to 
damage circuitry and interfere with random 
number generation, which will make it easier 
to break encryption. 
Insert probe pins into the chip to monitor data 
on the chip’s buses. 
Environmental Require the surface of the chip to be exposed. 
Altering the physical environment around the 
card to induce the faults.  
This include altering temperature, UV 
radiation, light, or x-ray, and resulting the 
chip to behave abnormally and sometimes 
allow an attacker to bypass security measures, 
or gain extra information from the behavior 
of the card which may infer secrets. 
Side Channel Derive information without modifying a 
smartcards i.e. both the secure 
microprocessor and plastic card remain 
unaffected. 
Exploit information leaked by the physical 
characteristics of the card during execution of 
the algorithm.  Exploitation of information 
allows infer secrets in the form of timing 
power or radiation. 
Three types of side channel attacks: 
-A timing attack:  the time it takes for the 
card to execute the cryptographic algorithm 
depends on the value of the secret data. 
-Power analysis attack:  use information 
leaked by a card’s power consumption: 
 -Simple Power Analysis (SPA):  attacks rely 
on detailed knowledge of the cryptographic 
System classes (for Applet, transaction, I/O management)
Java Card Virtual Machine  Native methods
Hardware IC 
493 
 
algorithm being implemented, and visual 
inspection of the power consumption curve, 
to extract the cryptographic key 
-Differential Power Analysis (DPA):  more 
powerful attack based on SPA.  Adds the 
power of statistical techniques to separate 
signal from noise and require less detailed 
knowledge of the implementation of the 
cryptographic algorithm on the card 
-Electromagnetic analysis (EMA):  similar to 
DPA but exploit the information leaked in the 
electromagnetic emanation from the card 
while it is running. 
Software -Exploit implementation vulnerabilities in the 
card through its own communication 
interface. 
-Exploiting buffer overflow and using Trojan 
horse programs to deliberately inject 
malicious code into the card. 
 
3.0 THE MODEL OF POTENTIAL ATTACK 
According to Boswell (2009), in order to evaluate 
smartcard security, we need a framework of parameters 
with which to model an attack and to make statements 
about its difficulty. Rating vulnerabilities has historically 
proven difficult. In many cases, the precise details of 
vulnerability and the method of potential exploitation can 
both be significant. But of course this information may 
not be known at the time of rating, so that it proves 
difficult to give a single rating value that is suitably 
meaningful for all of its evaluation testing. The Common 
Criteria defines a model for calculating the difficulty of 
an attack, which it calls ‘attack potential’. (CCDB, 2008) 
The model parameters are described in table 6 below. 
Table 6: Parameters of attack potential to smartcard 
 
Parameter Description 
Elapsed time This is the time taken for the attack. It’s 
unlikely to spend more than 3 months 
attacking TOE.(Target of evaluation) 
Expertise This level of general attack knowledge and 
skill that an attacker must possess in order to 
carry out the attack. 
Knowledge of the 
TOE 
The knowledge that an attacker needs about 
the design of the target card (or chip). 
Access to the TOE The number of samples that an attacker 
requires in order to carry out an attack. More 
than one sample may be required because 
some attacks require card samples to be 
destroyed in order to find out information 
about the chip before the attack can be carried 
out. Other attacks may be prone to damaging 
the card when the attack is carried out, or may 
be likely to activate countermeasures that will 
shut down a card after a certain threshold is 
reached. The number of samples is measured 
against the thresholds 10, 100, more than 100. 
Equipment The type of equipment needed for attacks on 
smart cards can vary widely from a PC and 
card reader, through optical microscopes, 
digital oscilloscopes and lasers, to electron 
microscopes and focused ion beams 
workstations.  
Open sample The use of the samples that are deliberately 
weaker in some way than the real cards that an 
attacker would face. The weakness might be in 
the form of knowing keys or other secret 
values, in having the ability to load test 
applications onto the card, or it might be that 
certain countermeasures are deactivated on the 
test samples.  
 
The model parameter which is depicted above has 
contributed a number of points such as the attack 
potential, and the relationship between them. It also 
describes assurance levels in Common Criteria 
(Common Criteria, 2007). 
 
 
4. THE CURRENT TESTING METHODS 
AND TOOLS TO ASSESS SMARTCARD  
 
In managing the security risks of the potential attack of 
the smartcard, there are two smartcard test security that 
can be applied and proposed the methods and tools to 
test the security of smartcard (Yachuan and Yaqin, 
2009).  They proposed:-  
 
4.1 JACARTA 
JACARTA is a security assessment to the Java card. It 
has a tool that facilitate the testing, the analysis and the 
validation of the security and functionality of Java Card 
products. It was researched by Brightsight Company. It 
will permit the validation of the different components 
implemented on a Java card through the open standard of 
smartcards. The test suit is made up of the test that are 
based on runtime environment specifications which 
include API of Java card, global platform card and test 
program of Java virtual machine  actions. It applies the 
test suit by iterating the following phases. Firstly, the 
tool is authenticated to the card by an authenticated 
protocol. Secondly, the test applet is loaded onto the card 
and the appropriate test functionality that is incorporated 
in the applet is invoked. The applet will then responds to 
the loading, the installation and the removal processes, 
which will be specified by the Java card. After the entire 
test is complete, the test tool will generate a report for 
the tested result. Finally, the applet is deleted from the 
card. Therefore, the JACARTA tool can not only deal 
with the smartcard of unified standard, but also be used 
with some modification of code of the application 
program specified by the supplier. 
 
4.2 JCAT 
JCAT is developed by LaBRI, Laboratoire Bordelais de 
Recherche en Informatique (Sauveron, 2003). JCAT will 
run in a different runtime environments. It is not only 
simulating attacking to hardware but also to the software. 
JCAT can also simulate the electromagnetic radiation to 
modify the content of the smartcard’s memory cell, and 
then modify some value of the target system. The 
simulator can test and run the program of the target card 
and check same malicious act. The work flow of the 
JCAT is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The work flow of JCAT 
 
 
JCAT will simulate the attack or test the executable 
program. It is characterized by the completion of the 
mission step by step, the observation of memory, the 
buffer, stack and etc. The provision of the state of 
analysis during the process of implementation and will 
perform the execution of the laser attack. The converter 
of JCAT converts the CAP file format into another form.  
Subsidiary tool of JCAT can help to modify the byte 
code. 
 
 
5.0 ANALYSIS OF FEASIBILITY OF 
ADOPTING THE TOOLS FOR MYKAD  
SECURITY 
 
This paper concludes the following:  
 
5.1 Attack Potential Model 
Most types of attack on smartcards cannot be completely 
explored during a commercially feasible evaluation 
period since new attacks appear over time, and known 
attacks may be improved and enhanced as targets are 
studied over time. This requires monitoring and 
‘recalibration’ of attack ratings over time, as well as 
some sort of agreement on a baseline set of attacks that 
should be covered in the limited evaluation time. 
Boswell (2009), recommends the use of the attack 
potential calculations as a guidance metrics to calculate 
the attack potential when there is no known specific 
vulnerability can be ascertained. For example, the 
‘bounding calculations’ can be used to estimate ‘if a 
vulnerability exists then it has an attack potential of at 
least x’.  
 
5.2 Test Tool 
 The basic principle of the two test tools JCARTA and 
JCAT is uniform to most of the smartcard, including 
MyKad, as they have an industry specific extension such 
as global platform API, the GSM API or proprietary 
extension. The tools that were proposed will be able to 
cope with the card proprietary schemes as well as vendor 
specific coding of applications. 
 
If independent third party is used, it would require 
sharing of the test methods and information about 
vulnerabilities between private companies and 
independent institutions (Jesang, 1995). The validation 
tools and method should be further investigated into 
different tools and method available in the market. It will 
require expertise in different domain of knowledge and 
require time and investment. 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION  
 
CyberSecurity, Malaysia (CSM), the agency under 
MOSTI is in the midst of carrying out a security 
certification to the next generation of MyKad. With all 
these measures, we hope that Malaysian citizens will 
have a full confidence on using MyKad applications. The 
validation tools and methods of MyKad certification 
should be considered and investigated by various 
Malaysian authorities. Furthermore, there isn’t yet a 
security testing tool on smartcard in Malaysian though 
Malaysian government was the first to claim the use of 
multi-application smartcard in the world.  The only way 
to gain citizens trust is to prove that the usage of MyKad 
is highly secured in its area of access service and system 
delivery. 
 
Above all, the government will have to ensure that a 
fool-proof system will be in place to safeguard the 
personal information embedded in MyKad, prior to 
introducing any projects that involves the public interest. 
It is hope that this research would stimulate development 
of the security testing tools. More research should be 
carried out on the security evaluation of MyKad for the 
benefit all Malaysian citizens.  
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